Divine Command Theory discussion questions answer the practices exam question, for the last question type in a word document PHI 1: Introduction to Philoso

Divine Command Theory discussion questions answer the practices exam question, for the last question type in a word document PHI 1: Introduction to Philosophy
Final Exam
UC Davis //
Name____________________
Choose the one best answer.
1. According to the Divine Command Theory,
a. if God commanded us to keep our promises, then he did that because keeping our promises is the
right thing to do.
b. if keeping our promises is the right thing to do, then that’s because God commanded that we keep
our promises.
c. blasphemy is wrong but slavery is not wrong.
d. adultery is just plain wrong, and God commanded us to not to commit it.
e. God exists for some cultures but not for others.
2. According to ethical egoism,
a. people always do what they believe to be in their own long-term best interest.
b. people always do what is in fact in their own long-term best interest.
c. people are morally required to do what is in their own long-term best interest.
d. people are rationally required to do what is in their own long-term best interest.
e. people are rationally required always to do what maximizes expected agentive utility.
3. According to normative cultural relativism,
a. different cultures have different views about what morality requires.
b. tolerance of and respect for the beliefs and practices of societies other than one’s own is the
supreme principle of morality.
c. morality is relative; there are no objective moral facts. For any given act A, that act is right
according to some frameworks and wrong according to others, and no framework is objectively
correct.
d. an act is morally permissible if and only if its agent believes that it is right.
e. if an act A is performed in society S, and that act violates the moral code of society S, then it is an
objective fact that act A is morally wrong. Anyone who believes that A is right is mistaken.
4. Utilitarianism
a. says that, morally speaking, you shouldn’t perform a given action unless no other action open to
you in the given situation has a higher utility.
b. is incompatible with the Divine Command Theory.
c. says that the rational thing to do in any situation is the option that maximizes expected utility.
d. doesn’t make sense unless moral relativism is true.
e. is a form of Error Theory.
5. Is the Divine Command Theory compatible with utilitarianism? That is, could they both be true at once?
a. Yes, because utilitarianism is a view about what it is rational for us to do, whereas DCT is a view
about what morality requires of us.
b. No, because utilitarianism requires us to reject religious practices.
c. Yes, at least if it’s possible that God’s only command to us is that we must always maximize
utility in every situation.
d. No, because if utilitarianism is true, there is no objective morality.
6. According to non-consequentialists:
a. the consequences of an action are irrelevant to whether the action is morally permissible.
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b. it is never morally permissible to perform the action, of those available, that has the best
consequences.
c. we often do the wrong thing without suffering any consequences of our misdeed.
d. there are possible cases in which the act (of those available to the agent at the time) that has the
best consequences is not morally required and may even be morally wrong.
7. Which of the following cases was presented in class as a potential counterexample to utilitarianism?
a. the organ transplant case.
b. Singer’s case of the drowning child.
c. the case of the Good Samaritan.
d. the case of wartime self-sacrifice.
We discussed the following cases:
Bystander: the bystander can
(i) do nothing, letting five die, or
(ii) throw the switch to the right, killing one, but saving the five.
Organ Transplant: the doctor can
(i) give the innocent person a check up and send him on his way, letting the five die, or
(ii) kill the innocent person (without his consent) and use his organs to save the five.
The Trolley Problem is the problem of explaining why it is morally permissible for the bystander to choose
(ii) in Bystander, whereas it is not permissible for the doctor to choose option (ii) in Organ Transplant.
8. Why doesn’t Letting Five Die Vs. Killing One Principle (“A must let five die if saving them requires
killing B” — essentially Foot’s Principle about positive and negative duties) solve the Trolley Problem?
a. Because that principle yields the result that it is permissible to kill the one in Organ Transplant.
b. Because that principle yields the result that it is not permissible to throw the switch in Bystander.
c. Because that principle yields the result that it is not permissible to kill the one in Organ
Transplant.
d. Because that principle yields the result that it is permissible to throw the switch in Bystander.
9. How would the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) apply to the Trolley Problem? According to Professor
Gilmore in lecture, DDE yields the result that:
a. neither throwing the switch in Bystander, nor killing the one in Organ Transplant, are permissible.
b. throwing the switch in Bystander might be permissible, whereas killing the one in Organ
Transplant is not permissible.
c. throwing the switch in Bystander is not permissible, but killing the one in Organ Transplant is
permissible.
d. both actions are permissible.
10. To say that a statement can be known without reliance on sense experience for justification is to say that
the statement is:
a. Analytic
b. A priori
c. Necessary
d. A posteriori
e. None of the above
11. Which of the following would Gettier accept?
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a. Sometimes, a person really does know a given proposition p (say, the proposition that Team 1 will
win), even though p is not true (Team 1 will not win). That is, it’s not merely that the person thinks
that he/she knows p. It’s that the person really does know p. And yet p is false.
b. Sometimes, a person really does believe a given proposition p (say, the proposition that Team 1
will win), even though p is not true (Team 1 will not win). That is, it’s not merely that the person
thinks that he/she believes p. It’s that the person really does believe p. And yet p is false.
c. Sometimes, a proposition p (say, the proposition that Team 1 will win) really is true, and yet the
world is not as p represents it as being (Team 1 will not win). That is, it’s not merely that some
person thinks that p is true. It’s that p really is true. And yet Team 1 will not win.
d. Sometimes, a person really does know a given proposition p (say, the proposition that Team 1 will
win), even though that person does not believe. That is, it’s not merely that the person thinks
that he/she knows p. It’s that the person really does know p. And yet the person doesn’t believe p.
12. Consider Case II from Gettier’s paper. According to Gettier:
a. Smith knows, but is not justified in believing, that Jones owns a Ford.
b. Jones does own a Ford, but Smith doesn’t know that Jones owns a Ford.
c. Smith is justified in believing, but does not know, that Jones owns a Ford.
d. Smith knows that Brown is in Barcelona, but Smith does not know that Jones owns a Ford.
13. Does the JTBN account help with Gettier’s Case II? [CLARIFICATION: ‘help with’ means avoid being
counterexampled by. So, the JTBN account helps with that case if and only if that case is not a
counterexample to the JTBN account.] If so, how?
a. It does not help. As applied to that case, it yields the same verdicts as the JTB account.
b. It does help. Since Smith’s justification for his belief that (h) (Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in
Barcelona) depends upon the belief that Jones owns a Ford, which is false, the JTBN account
says that Smith doesn’t know (h).
c. It does not help. As applied to that case, the JTBN account yields the verdict that Smith does not
know (h). But the correct verdict, according to Gettier and most others, is that Smith does know (h).
d. It does help. Since (h) is false, Smith doesn’t know it, according to the JTBN account, since on
that account knowledge is factive.
14. According to the JTBN analysis of knowledge, the reason why (in Gettier’s example) Smith doesn’t
count as knowing that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is that:
a. Smith believes that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, but this belief was not
caused by the fact that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
b. Smith believes that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, and he has a
justification for this belief, but he does not have a complete justification for it.
c. Smith believes that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, and he is justified in
holding this belief, but his justification depends on a false assumption.
d. Smith believes that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, but since the man
who Smith thinks will get the job is not the man who will really get the job, Smith’s belief is false,
and so cannot count as knowledge.
e. Smith is not completely certain that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket
(though he believes it).
15. Suppose that it didn’t rain yesterday, but Bob is 100% certain that it did rain yesterday. According to the
standard view of knowledge presented in lecture, does Bob know that it rained yesterday?
a. Yes, because to know something is just to be 100% certain that it’s true.
b. No, because even though Bob feels certain, others may disagree with him, and you can’t know
something if others think it’s false.
c. Yes, because if Bob is 100% certain that it rained yesterday, then it’s true for him that it rained
yesterday.
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d. No, because even though Bob is 100% certain that it rained yesterday, the proposition that he
believes is false, and one can’t know a false proposition.
e. Yes, because Bob believes that it rained yesterday, and belief is sufficient for knowledge.
16. Why, according to the standard view of knowledge presented in lecture, can’t knowledge simply be
defined as belief? I.e., why can’t we say that to know a given proposition is just to believe that proposition?
a. Because the mere fact that, say, Bush believed that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq
didn’t guarantee that he was 100% certain that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
b. Because it’s possible to know something and to believe it at the very same time.
c. Because there are clear cases in which a person does believe a given proposition but does not
know that proposition. Certain people believe that humans never landed on the moon. But no one
knows that humans never landed on the moon, since humans really did land there.
d. Because there are clear cases in which a person does know a given proposition but does not
believe that proposition. Certain people know that humans never landed on the moon. But no one
believes that humans never landed on the moon, since humans really did land there.
e. Because that definition would be circular. Belief is defined in terms of knowledge.
17. The three components of JTB account of knowledge discussed in class are:
a. Justification, Skepticism, and Belief
b. Property Dualism, Truth, and Belief
c. Justification, Truth, and Evidence
d. Justification, Truth, and Belief
e. Materialism, Evidence, and Belief
18. According to the standard view of knowledge presented in lecture, why can’t knowledge be defined as
true belief? That is, why can’t we say that a person knows a given proposition if and only if that person
believes the given proposition, and the proposition is true?
a. Because there are clear cases in which a person does know a given proposition but does not have a
true belief in that proposition. Certain people know that humans never landed on the moon. But no
one has a true belief that humans never landed on the moon, since humans really did land there.
b. Because some propositions can be both known and believed to be true.
c. Because some propositions can be both known and true.
d. Because it’s possible to know something and to have a true belief in it at the very same time. If I
know that there is a tree outside my office window, and I also happen to believe that there is one, and
furthermore there really is one, then I have a true belief in a given proposition and I know that
proposition at the same time.
e. Because there are clear cases in which a person does believe a given proposition and the
proposition is true, but the person does not know that proposition. When someone, on the basis of no
evidence, believes that horse #9 will win, and it does, the given person does not (prior to seeing the
race) know that horse #9 will win, though they believe it, and their belief is true.
19. As described in the lectures, propositions are:
a. sentences.
b. parts of sentences, such a words and phrases.
c. things that can be expressed by sentences and that can be true or false.
d. words that can be used to form propositional phrases, such as ‘of’, ‘from’, ‘in’, ‘over’, etc.
e. mental images, such as those that come to us in dreams.
20. According to Gettier, justification, truth, and belief are:
a. insufficient for knowledge.
b. unnecessary for knowledge.
c. irrelevant to knowledge.
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d. neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge.
e. all of the above.
Moral realism: Moral sentences such as ‘Mary’s act was morally wrong’ describe a domain of moral
facts, at least some of which obtain independently of our beliefs and practices.
Moral anti-realism: Moral realism is not true.
Argument A
(1)
(2)
(3)
If God does not exist, then moral facts do not exist.
Moral facts do exist.
Therefore, God exists.
21. If one is both a moral realist realist and an atheist, one will
a. reject both (1) and (2).
b. accept both (1) and (2) but claim that the argument is invalid, and reject (3).
c. reject (2) but accept (1).
d. reject (1) but accept (2).
e. None of the above.
Consider the following argument:
Argument B
(1)
If God exists, then there are moral facts.
(2)
There are moral facts.
(3)
Therefore, God exists.
22. An atheist who is a moral realist realist should respond to this argument by:
a. claiming that the argument is invalid.
b. accepting (1) but rejecting (2).
c. claiming that the argument begs the question.
d. accepting (2) but rejecting (1).
e. none of the above.
23. What is the difference between utilitarianism and consequentialism?
a. consequentialism leaves open questions about which things are intrinsically good, whereas
utilitarianism entails that pleasure and/or happiness are what is intrinsically good.
b. utilitarianism says that morality requires our acts to be useful, whereas consequentialism says that
morality requires our acts to have good consequences.
c. consequentialism is a view about which things are intrinsically good (pleasure and/or happiness
only), whereas utilitarianism is a view about which acts are morally right (the ones that have the best
consequences).
d. utilitarianism is a view about which things are intrinsically good (pleasure and/or happiness only),
whereas consequentialism is a view about which things are intrinsically bad (pain and/or
unhappiness only).
24. As discussed in lecture, Robert Nozick’s Experience Machine example is designed to show that
a. pleasure is not the only thing [that] is intrinsically good for a person.
b. we can’t tell whether or not there’s an external world.
c. the morally right act is not always the one with the best consequences.
d. it is intrinsically bad for a person to think that her so-called ‘friends’ are mere illusions.
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The Deceiver Argument
1. Your sensory experiences could come about through ordinary perception, so that most of what
you believe about the world is true. But your sensory experiences could also be caused
deceptively, so that what you believe about the world is entirely false.
2. You have no reason at all to believe that your sensory experiences arise in one way rather than
another.
3. [Underdetermination Principle] If you are faced with two or more mutually exclusive hypotheses,
and the information available to you gives you no reason to believe one rather than another, then
you don’t know that either hypothesis is the case, and you have no reason to think that either is
any more likely than the other.
4. If (1), (2), and (3) are true, then you don’t know that the real world hypothesis is true, and you
are not justified in believing that it is any more likely than its main competitors.
5. So, you don’t know that the real world hypothesis is true, and you are not justified in believing
that it is any more likely than its main competitors.
25. According to the explanationist response to the Deceiver Argument, do we have (epistemic) reason to
believe that the real world hypothesis is more likely to be true than the isomorphic skeptical hypothesis?
a. Yes. The real world hypothesis is a better explanation of our evidence than the isomorphic
skeptical hypothesis, and this makes it more likely to be true.
b. No. The real world hypothesis is a better explanation of our evidence than the isomorphic
skeptical hypothesis, but as far as we can tell, this is irrelevant to the question of which is more likely
to be true.
c. Yes. Only the real world hypothesis fits our experiential data. The isomorphic skeptical hypothesis
predicts that we feel ourselves to be trapped inside a computer, when in fact we feel no such thing.
d. No. Since both the real world hypothesis and the isomorphic skeptical hypothesis fit our
experiential data equally well, we should take them to be equally probable.
e. Yes. The real world hypothesis is the best explanation of this piece of data: the external world
exists and is approximately as we experience it to be. The isomorphic skeptical hypothesis can give
no explanation of that piece of data.
26. According to the lectures, Descartes is
a. a skeptic about the external world.
b. a normative cultural relativist.
c. a rationalist and a non-skeptic about the external world.
d. an empiricist and a non-skeptic about the external world.
e. a mystic and a theist.
27. According to Descartes (in the First Meditation), which of the following possibilities gives Descartes a
reason to doubt that he has a body?
a. God might be deceiving him into thinking that he has a body, when in fact he doesn’t have
one.
b. Inductive arguments may be useless, given that the only empirical justifications for them are
circular.
c. God might be deceiving him into thinking that he is a human, when in fact he is a dog.
d. He might be an immaterial soul.
e. None of the above.
28. Jonathan Vogel advocates the Explanationist response to the Deceiver Argument for skepticism about the
external world. On the basis of the information available on the slides, it is most likely that Vogel counts as:
a. an idealist.
b. a skeptic about the external world.
c. an indirect realist about the external world.
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d. an anti-realist about knowledge.
Suppose that you are in a situation that is correctly described by the following decision matrix:
Play the game
Don’t play the game
Coin lands heads
(probability=.5)
utility=1,000,000
utility=0
Coin lands tails
(probability=.5)
utility= -999,999
utility=0
29. According to MaxEU:
a. morality requires you to play the game.
b. morality requires you not to play the game.
c. rationality requires you to play the game.
d. rationality requires you not to play the game.
30. In lecture, we discussed the Modest Response to the Argument from Evil. Initially, it seems plausible that
for some cases of suffering, there is no good reason to permit it, on the grounds that we are unable to detect
any justification for that suffering, even after careful consideration. As Professor Gilmore explained in
lecture, skeptical theists have replied to this by arguing that:
a. justifications for permitting the given cases of suffering are like dogs in a garage: if they were
there, we would see them. So we are justified in believing that there is no justification for the
suffering in question.
b. ju…
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