IRLS402 Lesson 3 AMU Bringing the great powers back in What does Drezner mean by ‘Bringing the great powers back in?” What viewpoint is he responding to? W

IRLS402 Lesson 3 AMU Bringing the great powers back in What does Drezner mean by ‘Bringing the great powers back in?” What viewpoint is he responding to? What are the counterarguments.

Instructions: Your initial post should be at least 350 words. Please respond to at least 2 other students. Responses should be a minimum of 150 words and include direct questions.


Lesson 3, See attached. The Game Theory Approach
Scholars and practitioners have pointed out the lack of international enforcement and the free rider problem. One
way to understand these is through the game theory approach. Games like stag hunt, chicken, and prisoner’s
dilemma give us a way to understand the actions of actors. To further understand this, please try one or two iterations
of this interactive prisoners dilemma. Even once folks have agreed to deal with an issue it can be hard to know when
violations occur. Your next task is to investigate pirate fishing at this interactive site.
Prisoner A Choices
Stay Silent
Confess and Betray
Each serves one month in Prisoner A goes free. Prisoner B serves full year in
Prisoner B
Stay Silent
Confess and
Prisoner B goes free
Each servces three months in jail
Prisoner A Choices
One issue that theorists disagree on is the importance of the hegemon. You need to consider whether a dominant
power is necessary for smooth functioning of regimes. Do we need a hegemon for establishing order? Daniel Drezner
in All Politics is Global, argues that when it comes to the regulation of the global economy, great powers are in
charge because they can provide the incentives (or disincentives) to dictate the rules of the game. When he talks
about power he means economic power: the internal market size and diversity. So, the US and the EU would be the
two powerful actors. Dresner goes so far as to argue that “The presence of a bargaining core among the great powers
is a necessary and sufficient condition for effective global governance” (p. 86). So what happens when there is not
great power interest? According to Dresner, there is likely to be a stalemate the results in weak or contradictory
standards or even “sham standards.”
Stay Silent
Confess and Betray
Each serves one month in Prisoner A goes free. Prisoner B serves full year in
Prisoner B
Stay Silent
Confess and
Prisoner B goes free
Each servces three months in jail
Regulatory Regimes
Regulatory regimes are those that regulate interactions such as human rights, environmental policy, immigration right, and antitrust policies. As globalization has intensified, regulatory regimes have become more complex. As we have discussed
earlier in the course, international regulatory regimes can provide us with the ‘rules of the game’ for global interaction. When states formally become members of a regime, they formally agree to bring their own policies in line with regime rules.
These rules are considered necessary because it is believed that states would not follow the prescribed rules without the regime. However, it may be that a few states are already following the rules and are joining to have influence over the
development of the regime and thus over the behavior of other states.
As you know by this point in your studies, members often create international institutions and organizations and legal institutions to help manage the regime and encourage compliance. Some have international courts attached their regimes such
as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). These courses are necessary because, among other reasons, there is often a strong incentive to defect from the
agreement. Obviously, international courts do not operate in the same way domestic courts do. They do not have a police force ready and waiting to carry out orders. However, international courts can be effective in reviewing violations and
encouraging compliance. One thing to consider as we continue is the circumstances under which they are effective.
MISH and recor
Conceptualizing Regimes
As M. J. Peterson has noted those conceptualizing regimes have focused on three primary elements:
“1) an interrelated array of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, 2) a group of actors using that array to guide their expectations regarding their own and others’ behavior, and 3) an issue-area where that array and those
expectations will be engaged. Understood properly, the third element indicates that no one international regime, and possibly not even the complete set of them, will extend to every issue area of international relations – a point made clear in the
long literature noting the relative paucity of international regimes in security affairs. Understood properly, the first indicates that to qualify as an international regime, actor expectations must be converging because they all accept and follow a
particular array of normative and procedural guidelines. If actor expectations converge for other reasons – some structural dynamic that does in fact channel choice very narrowly[21], common fright driving them in the same direction, individual
utility-maximizing that leads them to convergent choices, or simple accident – there is also no international regime at work.
Much of the work on the concept since 1982 has involved developing the third level of inquiry triggered by having a concept – specifying the indicators that permit determining whether particular things observed in the world belong inside or
outside the box. Though qualitative researchers eschew the term “operationalization” common among quantitative researchers, they also need ways to explain to each other why they regard this thing as belonging inside the concept box and
that thing as belonging outside.”
Theoretical Perspectives
Remember that for realists, regimes reflect the distribution power and are put in place to secure state interests. For neoliberals, regimes facilitate cooperation because states are anarchic but can share interests. For constructivists, as you might
be able to figure out, regimes can alter identities and interests and perceptions may change. The study of regimes and cooperation is only interesting if we can address the question of which conditions facilitate cooperation. The issue of
compliance with international regimes began to receive a great deal more attention in the 1990s. Compliance is not as difficult when regimes address coordination or assurance problems (Stein, 1982). Assurance regimes are when both actors
have the same preferred outcome, but there is the potential for one to mistakenly believe that the other’s preferences are not the same or that the other may not be rational. With such problems, the main challenge is simply determining the rules.
Once states have agreed to these rules, they are very like to obey them; it is in their individual interest to obey them. There is no temptation to cheat because there is little benefit to be gained from it. Things are not so easy when seeking
compliance with regimes dealing with collaboration problems where the collective aim is to reach an efficient outcome but preferences on how to do it may be different. Understanding and eliciting compliance with these regimes is much more
complicated States simply have greater incentives to violate the rules of the regime for individual gain.
Regimes Part II
As we noted last week, regimes are important for students of international regimes because we are notjust
interested in laws, but also in the political context within which laws are developed, disseminated, and enforced
That’s why the underlying questions of regime theory are how and why cooperation happens among competing
• Conceptualizing Regimes
• Theoretical Perspectives
• Regulatory Regimes
• The Game Theory Approach
• Challenges
Why Do Nations Abide by Laws and Norms?
According to Nicole Drumhiller, “As security regimes are more difficult to establish and arguably more difficult to
maintain, Jervis (1982) has established a set of circumstances which give rise to security regimes as well as identifying
variables which have a direct bearing on the security dilemma. The four conditions Jervis (1982) identifies as having a
deciding factor in the formation of security regimes include: first, that great powers have a desire to create a regime to
bring about a greater amount of regulated activity, second, the other state actors must believe that all other members
share the same cooperative security value, as cooperation will not occur if an actor is perceived to have strong
opposing values to the status-quo; third, all actors must believe that security is not best achieved through expansion;
and fourth, war and the individual pursuit of security must be viewed as being more costly than a cooperative security
Another complication is that different international regulatory regimes may be in conflict with each other. Each regime
is promoting its own policy goals. It’s entirely possible that a trade regime may be in conflict with an environmental
regime or a human rights regime in conflict with an environmental one. The challenge with this is to understand what
the hierarchical relationship between regimes would be. In other words, which regimes trump which other regimes.
Without a clear blueprint, states may very just comply with the regime that is most in their interests. This can be
particularly frustrating for those in the human rights community who often see their regimes trumped by another
regime. Trade and investment regimes may be given preference. Some argue that in extreme cases this leads to the
“double bind problem” in which states are required to live up to human right commitments to their domestic
populations, they are discouraged from doing so internationally because the international trade system is not set up
to encourage this (De Schutter 2012, 791).
Why Do Nations Abide by Laws and Norms?
1. Some are motivated by fear of chaos and the need for order. This would particularly apply to status quo states, that is, states that are benefiting from the
current world order. This would be less true of so-called rogue states that are displeased with the current order.
2. Some states consent to achieve common aims – for instance, it benefits all states to have safe airways.
3. Another reason is that states may be enlightened self-interest-risk of losing offset by advantages of living in a world where disputes are settled peacefully.
4. Some states may find compliance to be a necessity to predict the behavior of other nations.
5. Many times states comply to maintain their credibility. They need credibility in order to conduct successful foreign policy. Credibility may be increased by
observing international law.
6. States may be complying out of habit. Like individual states may just sometimes be engaging in habitual acceptance.
7. World opinion-Some may argue that world opinion could be a reason for compliance. This could overlap with credibility.

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